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Widening access and selective excellence 
A dominant trend in higher education over the last centuries has been expanding 
participation. Initially, this was viewed as part of the organic growth of the middle class. 
Universities were initially attended by a small intellectual or social elite and their role was 
teaching universal knowledge. By the early 19th century Europe, under the influence of the 
scientific revolution, they became the training ground for professionals. The US Land Grant 
University, developed slightly later under the 1862 Morrill Act, was probably the first “mass” 
higher education institution; focused on teaching agriculture, science, and engineering as a 
response to the industrial revolution, it sought to meet the needs of a changing social class 
structure rather than simply concentrate on the historic core of classical studies. The 
American Graduate School of the early 20th century played a similar role for the next 
generation of scholar-researchers. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the post-WW2 
era in Europe provided the impetus for rapid change and further expansion – new 
institutional models, notably community colleges in the US and fachhochschulen, institutes 
of technology and polytechnics, etc. in Europe and elsewhere, catered for a wider range of 
socio-economic and learner groups, educational requirements and new careers in 
“technical, semi-professional, and managerial occupations” (Trow, 1974, 146). Similar trends 
are apparent around the world.  
In more recent decades, policy emphasis changed from the “priority given to ‘inherited 
merit’ in the admission process through a commitment to formal equality, towards the 
application of some modes of affirmative action for selected underrepresented groups” 
(Clancy and Goastellec, 2007, 136). In other words, in contrast in earlier decades when 
growing participation was arguably an unplanned by-product of expansion and massification 
(Parry, 2006), the priority today is to widen access to include “disadvantaged” groups 
hitherto outside the higher education net due to socio-economic, race, ethnic, age, gender 
or life circumstances. This has occurred in line with recognition of a strong correlation 
between educational attainment and contribution to social and economic prosperity. The 
OECD (2009) calculates that people who complete a university degree can look forward to 
significantly greater gross earnings premium over his/her lifetime compared with someone 
who only completes secondary school. People who complete a high-school education also 
tend to enjoy better health than those who quit at the minimum leaving age. And people 
with university degrees are more interested in politics and more trusting of other people. 
There are public and private benefits.  
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Accordingly, access to higher education has changed from being a privilege of birth or talent 
or both (elite phase) to a right for those requiring certain qualifications (mass phase) to 
being an obligation for the vast majority of society and occupations (universal phase) (see 
Table 1 below). These “phases” are ideal types, and may occur in tandem at the institutional 
level or represent sequential stages at the system level. The important point, however, is 
that as participation expanded, socio-economic diversity has failed to materialise in the 
same proportion (Douthat, 2005; O’Connell et al, 2006; Gallacher, 2006; Adnett and Slack, 
2007). According to Clancy (2006, 141; Vincent-Lancrin, 2008, 72), despite individual 
initiatives, “the more universal pattern is that the lower the prestige of the higher education 
institution, the less selective are the admission criteria” or, conversely, more prestigious 
universities operate more selective admissions policies. Indeed, despite government policy 
favouring widening access, selectivity has become an increasingly important brand 
differentiator for many HEIs in a globally competitive marketplace.  
Table 1: Elite to Mass to Universal Participation 
 Elite  Mass  Universal  
% age 
population  
0-15% 16-50% Over 50% 
Attitudes to 
access  
Privilege of birth or 
talent or both  
Right for those requiring 
certain qualifications  
Obligation for the 
skilled working, middle 
and upper classes  
Functions of 
higher 
education  
Shaping mind and 
character of ruling 
class; preparation for 
elite roles  
Transmission of skills; 
preparation for broader 
range of technical elite 
roles  
Adaptation of "whole 
population" to rapid 
social and technological 
change  
Source: Adapted from Brennan, 2004, and Trow, 1974. 
These trends have accelerated in recent decades under the influence of, and obsession with, 
global rankings. Using a variety of indicators to compare academic performance, rankings 
have, regardless of criticism (Hazelkorn, 2011; Rauhvargers, 2011), become a basic litmus 
test of quality and reputation. Their focus on world-class excellence has helped promulgate 
a singular model of “world-class university” as the panacea for success in the global 
economy. This has pushed up the status premium of elite universities, their hosting nations, 
and graduates from those institutions.  
This is occurring at the same time that access to talent has become a major challenge for 
national strategies based on growing knowledge-intensive industries. Yet, many countries 
face demographic pressures. While the world population may be increasing, the population 
of more developed regions is dependent on net migration. In 2005, young people 
represented 13.7% of the population in developed countries but their share is expected to 
fall to 10.5% by 2050 (Bremner et al., 2009, 2, 6). Recruiting international students has 
therefore become a necessary feature of national and institutional policy and target for 
national trade missions. In turn, international students have become frequent users of 
global rankings because of their lack of local intelligence. This focus on talent also accounts, 
in part, for the priority given to widening participation.  
As the cost of providing post-secondary education to meet societal demand rises 
exponentially, governments are faced with profound choices. This is especially acute in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis 2008 when many public budgets are facing deficits. 
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Accordingly, many governments and HEIs are drawing simplistic connections between 
excellence and exclusiveness – with implications for participation in higher education and 
student choice. Thus, notwithstanding the broad trend towards universal access, 
counteracting tendencies are leading to more highly stratified systems.  
This chapter looks at the tensions between these different agendas, and how rankings are 
attenuating the tension between egalitarianism and excellence through the behavior of how 
aspiring students choose and institutions select. Part I draws on international experience to 
examine how students choose, and the role that rankings play in the selection process; part 
ii, looks at the process from the institutional perspective and in particular focuses on the 
extent to which universities are becoming aggressively more selective in order to boost 
prestige and rank. Finally, part iii, asks what effect rankings are having on broader policy 
objectives of widening participation, and whether strategies of selective excellence2 are 
intensifying reputational and social stratification.  
Student Choice and Rankings3 
As participation rates rise, the profile of students attending higher education has become 
more diverse. While some people “know from an early age that they will pursue higher 
education, for others the decision to attend college is not so obvious” (Brewer et al, 2002, 
52). Students consider a range of issues when making choosing a college and university; this 
includes, for example, price and cost, course or programme, location, quality of facilities, 
social life and academic reputation (Bergerson, 2010). Over the years, students have 
adopted a stronger consumerist approach, assessing their choice of an institution and 
educational programmes as an opportunity-cost or the value-added. James et al. (1999, 75–
76, 71) concluded that students seek to “maximise the payoff from their academic results in 
a largely reputational market” in “which the implicit ranking of institutional prestige is 
closely associated with entry scores”. But students are not a homogeneous group; while 
ability, ambition and socioeconomic status influence choice, most “students do not possess 
perfect information about the stream of costs and benefits” of attending a particular 
institution rather than another (Brewer et al, 2002, 54; Dill and Soo, 2004).  
Undergraduate students usually attend a local university using a combination of local 
intelligence from peers and family, local rankings, college guides or entry scores, depending 
upon family or financial circumstances and/or availability of institutional or subject choice. 
Internationally mobile undergraduate students are a more varied cohort, choosing to study 
abroad because of the absence of choice or opportunity at home or to enhance their 
educational experience as part of an exchange programme. In the latter case, decisions are 
likely to be made on the basis of institutional partnerships, while in the former, choices are 
influenced by family or institutional connections, ease of residency and/or future 
employment and career opportunities. Graduate students are most keenly attuned to the 
perceived after-sale value of their qualifications, and are likely to use rankings to inform 
their choice, especially if that choice is outside the country. This is especially true for 
international graduate students, who are a growing and strategically important percentage 
of students worldwide (Guruz, 2008, 161–235). They comprise almost half the international 
                                                     
2
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higher education during the 1990s. This paper develops the concept with respect to student selection and 
institutional stratification as an outcome of the reputation race.  
3
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students in the US, UK and Australia, and approximately one-third in France and Japan 
(Guruz, 2008, 172, 199). For them, reputational factors are a significant factor in their 
decision-making, and as such, these students have become the primary target audience and 
user of rankings.  
Increasing participation rates, higher tuition costs and value-for-money concerns have 
helped transform decision-making into a more complex process for students. At the same 
time, the rise of the internet and new forms of communication have revolutionised access 
to information, stimulating growth in publications marketed under the generic title of 
university guide. College guides emerged to meet the growing demand for information 
(Hunter, 1995, 5–9). Many were published under a generic Good University Guide title and 
were widely used by domestic undergraduate students. Today, this kind of information is 
increasingly available on-line, e.g. RealUni.com, the Push Guide, Springboard, the Times 
Good University Guides, Apply2Uni. The rankings produced by US News & World Report Best 
Colleges (USNWR) were an early mover in the US domestic market, responding in the 1980s 
to the need for more information and greater mobility by undergraduate students. Over the 
last decade, the number and type of rankings has grown exponentially, satisfying a “public 
demand for transparency and information that institutions and government have not been 
able to meet on their own” (Usher and Savino, 2006, 38; Dill and Soo, 2004; Hazelkorn, 
2012). As the Swedish National Agency for Higher Education said: because “students invest 
both time and money in their education...it is important for potential students to have 
access to comprehensive and relevant information about higher education before they 
choose” (HSV, 2009, 6). 
Today, there are national ranking in more than 50 countries, and 10 global rankings – some 
more influential than others. In addition, there are discipline-based rankings, primarily 
focused on professional subjects such as medicine, law and business. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the breadth of rankings currently available worldwide. The choice of indicators 
and the weights (or percentages) given to each vary from one ranking to the next, but 
broadly all claim to provide information about the overall quality and performance of the 
university or programme of study. Global rankings are controversial because they focus 
primarily on research which is usually seen to be less relevant for undergraduate students. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of alternative international comparable information, rankings 
are now widely used by a variety of stakeholders, including students.  
Student reaction in 2010 is discernibly different than the latter part of 20th or early years of 
this century when rankings existed principally in the US; national context is also important. 
In some countries, national accreditation or quality agencies can set a framework for 
understanding higher education quality, in others national and/or global rankings dominate 
while in others student mobility within the country or to study abroad can be significant. 
The widespread availability, accessibility and publicity given to electronic media and 
rankings have had a big influence on students and student choice (McManus-Howard, 2002, 
114, 107–108).  
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Table 3.  Examples of Rankings by Unit of Analysis and Scope 
 Institutional Discipline/Sub-
Categories 
Specialist 
International  Leiden Ranking – 
Centre for Science 
and Technology 
Studies (CWTS) 
(Netherlands)  
 Performance Ranking 
of Scientific Papers 
for Research 
Universities [HEEACT] 
(Taiwan) 
 Professional Ranking 
of World Universities 
(France) 
 SCImago Institutional 
Rankings 
 Academic Ranking of 
World Universities 
[ARWU] (China) 
 QS Top University (UK) 
 THE Thomson Reuters 
World University 
Rankings (UK) 
 U-Multirank 
(European 
Commission) 
 Webometrics (Spain) 
 Business Week MBA 
 Economist 
Intelligence World 
MBA Rankings 
 Financial Times MBA 
 Wall Street Journal 
MBA 
 University Systems 
Ranking. Citizens and 
Society in the Age of 
Knowledge (Lisbon 
Council)  
 National System 
Strength Rankings (QS)  
 Green Metric World 
University Ranking 
(Universitas Indonesia) 
National  Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry (Sweden) 
 CHE-
HochschulRanking 
(Germany) 
 Elsevier Guide: De 
beste studies 
(Netherlands) 
 Forbes College 
Rankings (US) 
 Good University Guide 
(Australia) 
 Google College 
Rankings (Various) 
 Guangdong Institute 
 Asiaweek MBA School 
Rankings (2000) 
 Brian Leiter’s Law 
School Rankings (US) 
 Dataquest (India) 
 India Today (India) 
 Le Nouvel 
Observateur (France) 
 Mint (India) 
 Outlook (India) 
 Sharif Magazine 
(Iran) 
 Saviors of Our Cities 
(US) 
 Washington Monthly 
College Guide (US)  
 Washington Monthly 
Ranking of Community 
Colleges (US)  
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of  Management 
Science  (China) 
 Guardian University 
Guide (UK) 
 La Republica (Italy) 
 Macleans On Campus 
(Canada) 
 National Accreditation 
Centre Rankings 
(Kazakhstan)  
 Netbig (China) 
 OHEC (Thailand) 
 Perspektywy (Poland) 
 Petersons College 
Rankings (US & 
Canada) 
 Princeton Review (US) 
 Sunday Times 
(Ireland) 
 Times Higher 
Education University 
Guide (UK) 
 University Rankings 
(Ukraine) 
 U-rank (Sweden) 
 USNWR College 
Rankings (US) 
 Washington Monthly 
(US) 
 Wuhan University 
Research Centre for 
Science Evaluation 
(China) 
 Toplawschools.com 
(US) 
 Undergraduate 
American 
universities rankings  
for international 
students (US) 
 USNWR Top Med 
Schools (US) 
 WPROST MBA 
(Poland) 
Regional   AsiaWeek – Asia’s 
Best Universities 
(HongKong) 
 CHE Excellence 
Ranking Graduate 
Programmes 
 Ranking 
Iberoamericano (Pan 
Hispanic)  
  
Source: Adapted from Hazelkorn, 2011 
While there is some variation between different studies, US analysis (Hossler and Foley, 
1995; McDonough et al., 1998; Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999; Ehrenberg, 2005; Griffith and 
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Rask, 2007) shows rankings are especially important for high ability and second generation 
students, the latter from Asian (or non-US citizens) backgrounds wanting a doctoral, 
medical, or law degree. Spies (1978) similarly argued that above average students tend to 
make choices based on non-financial factors, such as reputation; these students are likely to 
attend higher ranked colleges even those ranked higher by just a few places. As many high-
ranked institutions charge high tuition fees, this suggests high achievers are less price-
sensitive or make a strong cost-benefit assessment taking account of anticipated labour 
market return from such qualifications.  
Students using rankings are more likely to be concerned about a college’s academic 
reputation (91%) and a school’s social reputation (41%) (McDonough et al., 1998). Likewise, 
as distance increases so do the proportion of students placing weight on rankings 
(McManus-Howard, 2002, 111); similarly, students attending private universities are more 
likely to use rankings. This pattern is reproduced in other countries. Stella and Woodhouse 
(2006) also found that students from upper middle-class and upper-class families in the UK 
(1999), US (1999), Chile (2002) and India (2004) were most likely to avail of guides or 
rankings. James et al. (1999, x) similarly found Australian applicants to “research” 
universities were “more strongly influenced by research reputation, institutional image and 
prestige, and the on-campus social and cultural life than the others”. In contrast, low-
income and first-in-family students are least likely to consider rankings important, because 
they are likely to enrol in lower status or other non-selective institutions which are not 
usually ranked (Clarke, 2007, 39). No significant gender differences were noted. 
Students taking professional-focused programmes are more likely to use rankings in 
contrast to students on traditional academic programmes. US students pursuing 
engineering, business or science programmes, which are among the most attractive fields of 
study for international students (IIE, 2007), are more likely to refer to rankings than arts, 
humanities or social science students (HERI, 2007). This correlation is replicated in a UK 
study, which found “positive impact *for+ home and particularly overseas mechanical 
engineering students but weaker and inconsistent links with nursing and architecture. There 
is some positive association between rankings and computer science and chemistry 
especially “when a university rank rises than when it falls” (Roberts and Thompson, 2007, 
26).  
International students are especially receptive to rankings. A 2008 UK study found that 
overseas students, especially engineering students, were interested in quality rankings (Soo 
and Elliot, 2008, 14). Roughly one third of international students to Sweden in 2007 and 
2008 used rankings as a vital source of information; this was especially true for Asian and 
Latin American students (HSV, 2009, 39). Similarly, Chinese, Japanese and Korean students 
enrolled on graduate programmes were heavily influenced by Canada’s reputation for high 
quality education; the findings were particularly significant for engineering and business 
students (Chen, 2007, 771). While postgraduate students are more concerned about 
institutional position than undergraduate students, both rate institutional reputation very 
valuable for career opportunities (i-graduate, 2010).  
That reputational characteristics, such as rankings, influence student choice in explicit and 
implicit ways has often been explained as being symptomatic of a particular culture. 
However, this practice is both widespread and growing; academic reputation is now seen to 
be the “most relevant student-choice factor” (Simões and Soares, 2010, 385). Attendance at 
select(ive) universities and colleges is seen to “confer extra economic advantages to 
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students, in the form of higher early career earnings and higher probabilities of being 
admitted to the best graduate and professional schools” (Ehrenberg, 2004; Clarke, 2007; 
Hossler et al, 1989), and indirect benefits, e.g. connections to elites and future decision 
makers, membership of “the right” social and golf clubs and schools, etc. An Irish journalist 
asked if “it [was] just inertia or snobbery that makes Google hire principally from Trinity 
[College Dublin], UCC [University College Cork] and UCD [University College 
Dublin]?”(Keenan, 2010). A similar experience was recorded in Germany; rankings are said 
to provide a “valuable tool for many companies both in the field of recruiting and research” 
(Employer organization, Germany). US law firms regularly use USNWR to “determine the 
threshold for interviews” (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 19). A UK study similarly found 25% 
of graduate recruiters interviewed “cited league tables as their main source of information 
about quality and standards” (HEFCE, 2006, 80, 87–92; Shepherd, 2005), with one UK job 
applicant being told she must “hold a degree from a THE-QS top 100 university ranked at 
number 33 or higher (sic)” (Hazelkorn, 2011, 148).  
Institutional Selection  
In addition to bringing revenue, students can add to the prestige of an institution; according 
to Brewer et al (2002, 60) prestige-seeking institutions often “place more value on a 
student’s potential contribution to prestige than it does on that student’s direct 
contribution to revenues”. Student selectively has become a key ingredient of the so-called 
reputation race (Lucido and Thacker, 2011). As the traditional student market declines 
relative to non-traditional student groups and as competition for high-achieving and 
internationally mobile students intensifies, universities worldwide have adopted more 
professional and aggressive approaches to student recruitment and selection – 
euphemistically called “enrolment management” (Quirk, 2005). Many have refocused or 
revised admissions policies and procedures, and expanded marketing and publicity activities 
into year-round professional offices with rapidly expanding budgets and staff. An Australian 
Vice-chancellor of a pre-1900 research-intensive university commented:  
…given the importance of the international market, the university will be 
spending more time and money on marketing overseas, especially aimed at 
postgraduate students. They will be sending teams to the various student 
recruitment fairs in a way which they have not done before (Hazelkorn, 2011, 
104). 
Given the mounting evidence that rankings can influence student choice, it’s not surprising 
that rankings are an important ingredient of this strategy.  
According to a 2006 survey of university presidents worldwide, almost 50% used their rank 
for publicity purposes, and 63% said they were particularly advantageous for student 
recruitment (Hazelkorn, 2011, 104). In all cases, HE leaders admit highlighting (positive) 
results on their webpage, in speeches, at new faculty or student orientation or international 
meetings. This compares favourably with a recent survey by the US National Association for 
College Admissions Counselling (NACAC, 2010, 2-3) which found 62 per cent of its members 
spent at least some time discussing rankings with high school students and their families, 
with 16.5% making a copy of rankings available for students’ use. This emphasis on rankings 
is not surprising given the evidence that students can be and are strongly influenced by 
them. Using rankings to publicise or entice students from more diverse geographical, social, 
demographic, racial or international backgrounds is an effective and arguably essential way 
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to expand the potential customer base; reliance on a “narrow segment of the student 
market is risky” even for the most prestigious universities (Brewer, 2002, 62). 
Accordingly, universities in all parts of the world have been adjusting admissions policies to 
enhance the selectivity of their student entry cohort. This is because many rankings – both 
national and global – use student entry data as a proxy for student achievement on the 
basic assumption that a roughly similar range of performance can be expected throughout 
their higher education career. Conversely, college entry scores, preparatory examinations or 
secondary school scores as well as the applicant rejection rates have been shown to affect 
reputation and prestige (Sweitzer and Volkwein, 2009) as students and their parents assume 
higher entry requirements or the level of selectivity into a university or onto a programme 
of study is equivalent to better academic quality. Institutions gain prestige if they can be 
more selective. 
Studies have repeatedly shown a strong correlation between institutional reputation, 
rankings and student application behaviour (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999, 10; Ehrenberg, 
2001, 26). According to Bastedo and Bowman (2010, 177), “assessments of reputation are 
substantially influenced by (a) overall rankings, (b) tier [reputational] level, and (c) changes 
in tier level”. Slight changes in an institution’s rank can “cause perceptible ebbs and flows in 
the number and quality of applicants” (Dichev, 2001, 238; Sauder and Lancaster, 2006, 116), 
especially by international students. Bowman and Bastedo (2009, 18) argue that media 
reportage of rankings – especially when the results of rankings are placed on the “front 
page” – can also exert a powerful effect on admissions: “being labelled as a ‘top-tier’ 
institution carries substantial weight, much more so than moving up a single spot within the 
top tier” (Meredith, 2004). An institution whose rank improves receives more applicants 
and, with the number of student places remaining constant, can accept a smaller 
percentage of applicants and hence increase its selectivity, whereas a less favourable rank 
might force an institution to accept a greater percentage of applicants. The resulting 
entering class is of lower quality, as measured by its average entry scores (Monks and 
Ehrenberg, 1999, 10). The circle repeats itself, leading to a downward spiral in terms of 
ranking position.  
HEIs have also sought to influence the number of applicants it receives through aggressive 
publicity or marketing efforts while still retaining the same number of available places; in 
this way the actual percentage of students accepted, known as the selectivity index, rises 
(Corley and Gioia, 2000, 325–326; Hoover, 2010; Mahoney, 2006).  
The algorithm used by U.S. News puts a heavy emphasis on college grade-
point averages and Law School Admission Test scores. Together, those two 
numbers determine about 22 percent of a school’s ranking....In short, 
students’ academic credentials determine close to a quarter of a school’s rank 
— the largest factor that schools can directly control (Segal, 2011).  
HEIs may also limit class or cohort size because “a larger class means dipping further down 
in a school’s applicant pool and thereby reducing average student quality” (Winston, 2000, 
10). Others might admit students on a probationary or part-time basis or establish 
associated colleges so that these students’ relatively lower entry scores will not be included 
in official data returns (Ehrenberg, 2001, 7). Institutions with lower entry scores are often 
seen as reducing their appeal to high achieving students, in turn affecting overall student 
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quality. Chapman University, California, is an interesting albeit not unique example of this 
phenomenon. 
In less than 20 years, Chapman has come to top the “selectivity rank” among 
master’s level institutions in the West, according to U.S. News. The minimum 
SAT score is now 1050. It has 45 endowed chairs. The endowment has grown 
from $20-million to $250-million. When U.S. News expanded the universe of 
colleges it ranks in 1993 by adding regional institutions, Chapman was in the 
second quartile of all such institutions in the West, and its academic 
reputation was ranked 90th among its 112 peers. It now [2007] ranks 11th 
over all among master’s level institutions in the West, and its academic 
reputation is tied for 14th highest in that group (Farrell and van der Werf, 
2007). 
Another US study found that between 1989 and 2007, the share of entering freshmen with 
SAT verbal scores above 700 rose from 33% to 78% at Yale University, from 24 to 67% at 
Stanford University, from 9 to 54% at the University of Pennsylvania, and from 18 to 68% at 
the University of Chicago (Schmidt, 2008). This translates into lower acceptance rates: 
"Stanford, for example, received 34,348 applications and accepted only 7.07% of those 
applicants. The rate was 26 percent a quarter-century ago and 62 percent 50 years ago (sic) 
(Editor, 2011; Steinberg, 2011). While there has been a significant expansion in participation 
rates in the interim, the change in the selectivity index suggests more is going on than 
simply more applications.  
Examples are not confined to the US, with evidence suggesting the practice is widespread 
even in open recruitment environments, such as operate in many European countries. In 
these circumstances, universities have less autonomy with respect to setting individual 
entry criteria or selecting students, however, it is possible to affect student entry by 
adjusting supply and demand, e.g. offering fewer places and thereby restricting access to a 
smaller number of applicants. According to Roberts and Thompson (2007, 5), there can be a 
strong correlation of 0.8 between rankings and the relative admissions quality of students, 
to the extent that “highly ranked universities get better students”. Universities which 
improve their rank by ten or more places are likely to experience a rise in the academic 
quality of students admitted in the following cycle. University prestige is also a key 
influencing factor in Japan; 25% of Japanese universities admit to using selectivity criteria in 
order to boost their chances of achieving “top level” status in national rankings (Yonezawa 
et al., 2009, 133; Turner et al., 2000, 402).  
At the graduate level there is less secrecy because the entry criteria are more likely to be 
assessed on an individual basis and related to the prospective programme of study. It is not 
uncommon for HEIs to use the ranking of the undergraduate institution as the basis to 
assess the applicant’s suitability, especially for international students. Private and for-profit 
institutions can more easily adapt their practices than public institutions, which are for 
obvious reasons open to scrutiny. In the US there has been criticism of the use of 
standardised tests, such as the SAT, as failing to recognise the diversity of student abilities; 
in response, many smaller, mostly liberal arts, colleges have decided to abandon their use as 
the determining factor. The question is whether that decision is based more on a desire to 
recognise a variety of talents and widen access or to make the admission process more 
opaque (Hazelkorn, 2011, 61; see also Robinson and Monks, 2002; McDermott, 2008; 
Palmer et al, 2011). 
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Tuition fees can play a similar role similar; they can provide a signal of selectivity on the 
basis that a higher fee is often perceived as being correlated with better quality. Bowman 
and Bastedo (2009, 434) claim that “colleges have increased tuition substantially in their 
efforts to become elite institutions”, because “lowering one’s tuition relative to one’s 
competitors may be perceived as signalling lower quality”. The debate in the UK over what 
is known as “top-up” or differentiated fees is a case in point; the government set a ceiling of 
€9,000 but ultimately the majority of universities sanctioned this fee level as a way of 
positioning themselves via-a-vis competitors and ensure world-class credentials (BBC, 2011). 
Universities may seek to affect “less visible price discounts”, e.g. grants, scholarships or 
loans, “in an attempt to attract additional students from their declining applicant pool” 
(Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999, 49). In these instances, financial aid is used “strategically” as a 
means of attracting high-calibre students; the effect is to skew the allocation of financial aid 
away from students with the greatest need to using merit aid to “purchase talent” (Quirk, 
2005; Lovett, 2005; Brewer et al, 2002, 63) – running counter to progressive 
funding/taxation models. The aforementioned UK tuition policy has been deliberately 
structured to encourage a bidding war amongst the most elite universities for the most able 
students who look to benefit from “special deals” (Grimston, 2011; Morgan, 2011).  
For students, the downside is being attracted to a university because of the largesse of its 
merit scholarship only to find the university offered more scholarships than it planned to 
renew the following year. Merit scholarship programmes can help universities buy “smarter 
students to enhance their cachet and rise in the rankings” (Segal, 2011) but there can also 
be a snag. As universities seek to offer an “appealing product” they need to either raise their 
tuition fees and/or have access to additional revenue sources such as philanthropy and 
endowment income, to pay for enhanced facilities (Tapper and Filippakou, 2009, 61). As 
tuition costs rise, students also begin to weigh up the added value and may opt to trade 
prestige for cost by choosing to attend a public or lower fee institution (Brewer et al., 2001, 
64-66; Reisz, 2011) – in the process becoming more consumerist and demanding.    
Does a low or falling ranking decrease student demand? A Canadian study found that 
“smaller, primarily undergraduate institutions suffer from a low placing in the annual 
national university rankings but larger universities do not” (Drewes and Michael, 2006, 783). 
Roberts and Thompson (2007, 5) suggest that other factors, such as institutional 
performance relative to peers, may be at play; for example, the performance of local and 
direct competitors may have a great impact depending upon how each institution performs. 
They also suggest a low rank can encourage institutions to take action to positively affect 
their entry level; UK universities which fell by ten places or more “managed to increase the 
grade average of their next intake” (author’s emphasis). Because student selectivity is often 
a consequence of supply and demand factors, institutions can influence student entry 
scores by reducing the total number of students accepted or sub-dividing programmes into 
a small niche-programmes each with smaller student intake. 
Does selective excellence widen inequality?   
The intensification of competition between nations and their universities for a piece of the 
global marketplace has accelerated the battle for (top) talent. This trend has been 
reinforced by the strong correlation between higher qualifications and career 
opportunities/lifestyle and the creation of a single global higher education market which has 
eased and encouraged international talent mobility. While the boundary between elite and 
non-elite universities was heretofore known amongst a few people, today, this is no longer 
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the case. In the era of massification and globalised information, the privileges associated 
with elite credentials are now widely acknowledged. Yet, people’s access to what are called 
“positional goods”, such as elite credentials, remains restricted and is “determined in accord 
not with absolute but relative real income” (Hirsch, 1997, 6). This has heightened the 
advantages associated with such degrees, widening the gap between winners and losers. In 
the process, gate-keeper status has been conferred on elite educational institutions because 
they are perceived as having the capability to boost one’s status relative to others. This is 
especially acute as competition for the best jobs and careers strengthens, and even people 
with advanced qualifications “struggle to achieve the trappings of the middle classes” 
(Brown et al, 2011, 11).  Rather than being innocent victims, universities and their faculty 
have become active participants in the construction of a hierarchically differentiated status 
system (Bastedo and Bowman, 2011, 10).  
While the US has had lengthier exposure to the stratification of higher education and its 
products (Barrow, 1996), international experience is catching up - fast.  
We're very selective, but we need to become even more selective...Our SAT's 
are rising, but not as fast as I'd like....We're going to build a new student 
center, upgrade the dorms, and use the rest to attract some faculty and 
student stars...That's what our competitors are doing. We can't afford not to 
(Quoted in Reich, 2000).  
Those who are looking at their institution on an international scale are fully 
aware of the potential of these ratings, rankings, evaluations to attract 
students, to attract faculty and so on and it is also commented in the 
newspapers, in comments in the media and so on (Professor of Chemistry, 
public post-1945 research regional university, Germany) (Quoted in 
Hazelkorn, 2011, 145). 
Higher education has always been competitive, but “rankings make perceptions of prestige 
and quality explicit” (Freid, 2005, 17, 89). Indicators commonly measure the quality of 
students: entry level, acceptance/selectivity ratio, completion/graduation rates and 
employability of graduates; quality of faculty and PhD students; research capacity and 
infrastructure; quality of facilities; and alumni contributions, which, in turn, influence an 
institution’s financial resources, per-student expenditures, faculty/student ratios, faculty 
compensations, etc. This methodology benefits older well-endowed and/or private 
universities compared with newer public institutions (Hazelkorn, 2011, 81).  
As the demand for higher education continues to grow in response to demographic and 
policy initiatives aimed at widening access it does not necessarily correspond with 
decreasing inequality (Vincent-Lancrin, 2008, 71-76). In fact, evidence suggests the “best” 
universities are the worst at widening participation (see Editorial, 2011). The discussion 
above illustrates how universities are adopting practices which arguably accentuate a 
socially-uniform student cohort on the back of competitive and comparative processes, such 
as rankings, which reward institutions becoming more elite. In addition to changes in 
admissions policies, some universities are either abandoning access programmes or 
establishing associate colleges so those graduation rates do not affect the overall outcome. 
To balance tensions between being a mass or publicly-funded university with greater 
prestige, some universities in the US and Europe are creating small honours or liberal arts 
colleges within the larger institution (Brewer et al 2002, 65; van der Wende, 2011). For 
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example, the new College of Humanities, at University College London, aims to “appeal to 
really discriminating students" (Burrows, 2011) and rival Oxford and Cambridge. This also 
enables institutions to be selective without having to provide the level of funding that might 
otherwise be expected (Brewer, 2002, 65-66).  
Even governments are getting in on act. Because few countries can afford the estimated 
€2bn annually per institution required for a place among the world’s top 20 without 
sacrificing other policy objectives, many governments are questioning their commitment to 
mass/universal higher education or asking whether their institutions are elite or selective 
enough. France, Germany, Russia, Spain, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Finland, 
India, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and Latvia – among many other countries – have launched 
“excellence” initiatives to create what are euphemistically called “world-class universities”. 
Individual US states (e.g. Texas and Kentucky) have also sought to build/boost flagship 
universities, elevating them to Tier One status, a reference to US News & World Report 
College Rankings. The aim is to encourage greater vertical or hierarchical (reputational) 
differentiation between institutions, with much greater distinction between research (elite) 
universities and teaching (mass) HEIs. This trend towards selective excellence is evident in 
other ways. The Danish (2010) and Dutch (2008) governments have raised immigration 
requirements to people with a qualification from the top-ranked universities (Beerkens, 
2009; Henriksen and Jessen, 2010). Financial rating agencies, such as Moody’s or Standards 
and Poors, also study application outcomes: "If an institution is not growing and improving 
selectivity, that would probably be more of a concern than it would have been a decade 
ago...” (Hoover, 2010). This is because selectivity is often used as an indicator of the capacity 
to attract wealthy high fee paying students or philanthropists/investors or to spawn well-
placed and influential graduates/alumni. 
In these circumstances, student behaviour is rational and smart (Freid, 2005, 16). A US 
survey saw a 56.2% increase since 1995 amongst students who said rankings are “very 
important” when deciding where to go to college, with the greatest increase amongst 
students attending private universities and by Asian students (HERI, 2007). These results are 
replicated around the world, with the sharpest results for high achievers and internationally 
mobile graduate students. But all students are especially sensitive to the publicity 
surrounding rankings. While rankings may not be the primary source of information, they do 
inform opinion, and are often the hidden hand shaping perceptions of quality and 
reputation. 
The reputation race is perverting policy objectives for widening access while staying close to 
the underpinning philosophy based on a vision of a meritocracy – that ability should 
supplant privilege. Yet, inequality can manifest itself in several ways and is often the “result 
of two combined influences, namely attainment at school and the decisions taken at each 
transitional point in education” (Vincent-Lancrin, 2009, 71). Tertiary entrance scores and 
secondary school performance correlate with socio-economic status (Palmer et al, 2011); 
Irish evidence shows students attending private secondary schools are most likely to attend 
the most prestigious university programmes (McGuire and Flynn, 2011).  
This chapter has looked at an additional factor – how rankings correlate reputation with 
indicators that reinforce socio-economic privilege, using student entry levels (Hazelkorn, 
2011, 59-62).  
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More and more schools define themselves as "selective" in an effort to boost 
their position and prestige, and fewer and fewer offer the kind of admissions 
process that provides real opportunities for poorer students. As a result, those 
disadvantaged students who do attend college are less and less likely to find 
themselves at four-year schools (Douthat, 2005). 
The question is not whether opportunities for high-achieving students should be “eclipsed” 
to serve “the needs of an increasingly diverse student population” (Bastedo and Gumport, 
2003, 355), but rather the extent to which rankings, wittingly or unwittingly, drive behaviour 
and reinforce social selectivity by institutional rank. Because of the emphasis on achieving 
“world-class” status, some governments and universities have told this author they worry 
the latter may not be elite enough or have too many students thereby threatening their 
status. Thus, the objective is to recruit “students who will be ‘assets’ in terms of maintaining 
and enhancing … *a university’s+ position in the rankings” (Clarke, 2007, p. 38). The issue is 
not simply about widening access, per se, but rather the degree of increasing stratification 
within the system; in other words, not simply “access to what” but “who gets what”.  
Institutional hierarchy has tended to be ignored in discussions about widening access, “as if 
all institutions were equivalent and interchangeable, obscuring the fit between the social 
hierarchy of students and the producer hierarchy of institutions” (Marginson, 2004, 234; 
Schindler and Reimer, 2011). But, rankings are exposing that myth while promulgating 
deeper inequalities, arguably exchanging traditional inequalities based on birth and privilege 
for “new inequalities” based upon the assumptive status of a small elite group of “world-
class universities” and their graduates. Since there is “no absolute measure of 
competency...sufficient for success”, performance is compared relative to other candidates 
(Bastedo and Jaquette, 2011, 320). And because, national status within the world-order has 
become a by-product of university rankings, government policy is balanced precariously 
between pursuit of excellence and pursuit of equity. At a time when the demand for higher 
education is rocketing, research suggests growing hierarchical differentiation and social 
stratification between privatised, selective, research, elite universities and public, recruiting, 
teaching, mass HEIs, educational systems – and their respective nations. The effect is to 
reward a “narrow band of students” (Lucido and Thacker, 2011, 2) attending a select few 
“world-class” or flagship universities rather than nurture all talent.  
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